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This paper addresses the issue of fiscal policy coordination in the context of the current crisis. It first aims at 
clarifying the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal 
authorities, and at exploring the foundations of the kind of coordination devices chosen, as well as the incentives 
and constraints on member states’ governments arising from the fiscal rules in the Euro Zone, both in tranquil and 
in stormy economic times. We then proceed with an analysis of the difficulties arising from the heterogeneous nature 
of the Euro Zone. In Section 3, we explore some of the possible causes of heterogeneity, with an emphasis on the 
issue of collective action and country size, with the coexistence of large and small countries, facing different incentives 
and constraints, hence tending to adopt divergent strategies in the occurrence of common macroeconomic shocks. 
Section 4 addresses the possible evolution in automatic fiscal stabilizers and Section 5 documents the size and 
structure of national fiscal stimulus packages. The concluding section advocates a better mix of rules and 
discretionary coordination for fiscal policies in the Euro Zone. 
 
   2 
Introduction 
 
The economic and financial crisis that has been spreading over the world economy since the 
beginning of 2008 has elicited strong policy reactions from national governments in almost all 
countries. In the immediate aftermath of the banking crisis and stock market collapse of 
September-October 2008, OECD countries have, for the first time in decades, announced large 
fiscal stimulus packages of Keynesian inspiration, while central banks have been pursuing 
extremely expansionary monetary policies. Yet, in spite of mounting evidence that the recession 
will, in 2009-2010 at least, be much more severe in the European Union (EU) than in the US, 
there have been no signs that additional policy measures will be implemented in European 
economies. Quite the contrary, on the eve of the London G20 summit of April 2, 2009, one of 
the major items of contention between the US government and Europeans was the size and 
significance of the various national fiscal stimulus plans: indeed, comparing the figures of the 
announced discretionary measures on both sides of the Atlantic, it appears that discretionary 
fiscal policies in EU member states are considerably less ambitious than what was enacted by the 
US Congress in February 2009. 
 
One major difference between the US and the EU is, of course, that the latter is a collection of 
sovereign states, with only limited common institutions and procedures to deal with common 
fiscal policy. Indeed, the 2008-2009 deep recession may be regarded as the first common 
macroeconomic shock of large magnitude hitting the infant European monetary union –the tenth 
anniversary of the euro was celebrated in January 2009. In this large group of relatively small 
countries, macroeconomic policy coordination resorts to the logic of collective action (Olson, 
1965). Factors explaining differences in incentives facing national governments should therefore 
be expected to play an important role in the choice of national strategies. One prominent 
parameter is country size, with smaller states being more tempted than larger ones by free rider 
strategies. 
 
The apparent difficulties with fiscal policy coordination within the EU and, more specifically, 
within the Euro zone, are the topic of this paper. Hence the image of herding cats. Several 
questions are in effect raised: first what are the circumstances under which cats would gain from 
being herded; then what are the possible reasons why they are so hard to herd; and finally how 
could institutions be modified to make it easier to herd these cats. 
 
This paper tries to clarify the economic rationale for fiscal policy coordination in a monetary 
union and to shed light on the sources of current difficulties and tensions in the field of fiscal 
policy in the Euro zone. In the first section, we survey the major arguments for policy 
coordination and discuss the possible objectives of coordination, as well as the major devices to 
coordinate fiscal policies. Section 2 emphasizes one important source of difficulties in the current 
EU configuration, namely the heterogeneity of national macroeconomic performances and initial 
situations, at the outbreak of the recession. Section 3 then analyzes the constraints and incentives 
that arise from these various tools of policy coordination, in order to better understand the 
choices facing national governments in such settings; we stress that country size is probably a 
relevant dimension to consider when analyzing the incentives facing national governments in a 
monetary union. In Section 4, we raise the issue of automatic fiscal stabilizers and of whether 
differences in their magnitude might explain the difference in discretionary fiscal stimuli. Section 
5 briefly discusses the contents of existing fiscal stimulus plans of a sample of EU countries. 
Finally Section 6 offers some tentative conclusions about the design of rules and institutions for a 
better macroeconomic policy mix in the Euro Zone. 
 
   3 
1.  Economic interdependencies, the nature of shocks  and the rationale for coordination 
 
What emerges from the abundant economic literature on policy coordination is the generic idea 
that the need for coordination arises in contexts characterized by interdependencies, due either to 
collective goods or to externalitiesiii
 
: in such contexts, decentralized decision-making in the 
absence of coordination devices will lead to sub-optimal, non cooperative, Nash equilibria. In a 
monetary union with decentralized fiscal authorities, economic interdependencies may arise from 
different channels. They result from the existence of collective goods, such as monetary stability 
or reputation on financial markets and vis-à-vis private agents in general, of public goods and 
common policies (defence, infrastructure building with network effects, etc.), or from spillovers, 
i.e. unintended consequences of national macroeconomic policies on other member states 
economies. Such spillover effects may be positive or negative. 
1.1. Sources of interdependencies 
 
When a group of countries participate in a regional economic integration process such as the 
European Union’s Single market, they decide to abolish barriers to private transactions in goods, 
capital and, in the European case, obstacles to labour mobility, all measures fostering market 
integration, which in turn is likely to increase the magnitude of spillover effects resulting from the 
use of national economic policy tools, such as fiscal policiesiv. Whether or not this process then 
spontaneously generates economic and financial convergence, intended as similarity in market 
conditions – prices and real incomes – as well as synchronicity and similar magnitude of business 
cycle fluctuations is still an open issue. Similarly, it is still unclear whether market integration, 
which generates a lowering of transaction costs, hence a mixture of specialization in production 
and agglomeration of productive activities, will make macroeconomic shocks more uniformly 
distributed across the whole area, or conversely more asymmetric and idiosyncraticv
 
.  
When countries form a monetary union, they share in common a single currency, and therefore 
uniform nominal variablesvi
 
 – mostly the short-term nominal interest rate, which is the main 
instrument in the hands of modern central banks --, which may in turn accentuate the reduction 
in transaction costs, hence goods and financial market integration. Monetary and financial 
stability of the currency area is then properly regarded as a “collective good”, insofar as it 
primarily depends on the joint use of their single monetary instrument, event though it may also 
be influenced by individual countries’ actions or circumstances. But members of the monetary 
union may also decide that other aspects of their joint venture are to be considered “collective 
goods”, be they of the traditional, public good kind, such as defence, or simply goods for which 
members collectively care, such as economic growth, or even some concept of distributional 
justice. In all such cases, the “collective good”, once it has been recognized such, is indeed a 
common concern and henceforth subject to all the difficulties arising in a context of 
interdependencies. 
The theory of “fiscal federalism” (Oates, 1972 and 1999) suggests that in all cases where 
spillovers are of significant magnitude, the simplest way of ensuring the emergence of collective 
action is to deprive local, decentralized authorities from the competence over the corresponding 
policy instrument and to transfer it to the central government. But in the case of the EU, in 
contrast to what has progressively emerged in federations such as the US, there is no such thing 
as a significant central budget. Or rather, the EU budget is the common budget of all 27 member 
states, not just of the Euro zone; and it is too small and constrained by a ceiling on its overall 
size, with a balanced-budget rule preventing any countercyclical management at the central level. 
Hence, in cases when collective action is required in the field of fiscal policy, it can only emerge 
as the outcome of a coordination of decentralized governments. 
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1.2. The nature and transmission of macroeconomic shocks 
 
But when is collective action really beneficial, and do the circumstances prevailing in 2008 
correspond to such a context? 
 
One of the numerous contributions of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory has been the 
celebrated distinction between two types of macroeconomic shocks hitting a currency union: 
common, or symmetric shocks, i.e. those that affect all members of the union in a similar fashion; 
and specific, idiosyncratic, or asymmetric shocks, i.e. those that hit only one, or a subgroup of 
members of the union. The conventional wisdom derived from this theory was that common 
shocks could be dealt with by using the only common instrument in the currency union, namely 
monetary policy, whereas asymmetric shocks would give rise to more trouble, because countries 
would no longer enjoy the benefit of independent currencies and because the channels of 
adjustments to such shocks might not be very effective in the case of the Euro Zone.  
 
This seems to be the reason why much energy was dedicated to designing rules, such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), that essentially aim at preventing national governments of 
individual countries from adopting divergent, “harmful” fiscal policiesvii. And conversely, not 
much had been put in place for the occurrence of common shocks, under the assumption that 
monetary policy alone could handle them. It is true that Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG) were instituted to make sure that at least some degree of coherence in national 
macroeconomic policies –fiscal policies and supply-side measures—is maintained. But BEPG are 
mostly concerned with medium-term strategies, and cannot be relied upon as a coordination 
device in the face of a sudden common shock calling for immediate action; it also appears that 
BEPG have been only moderately successful as an instrument of coordinationviii
 
. Not much 
attention was paid to the possibility of having to face a common macroeconomic shock: in the 
first version of the SGP, special circumstances that could excuse exceeding the 3%-of-GDP 
ceiling for budget deficits were defined as a more than 2% recession; but it was widely held most 
unlikely. 
Conventional wisdom also implicitly assumed that monetary policy would suffice to deal with 
common macroeconomic shock in the unlikely occurrence in which they might materialize. But 
the experience of Japan in the 1990s should have taught policy makers that there are 
circumstances in which monetary policy can no longer be relied upon, because it becomes 
ineffective due to the “zero barrier” –or “liquidity trap” in the language of old Keynesian 
economics—that prevents central banks from lowering real interest rates when inflation rates are 
close to zero or indeed negative. And for the first time since at least the Second World War, such 
a situation occurred in the Euro zone, as well as in the US and the UK. Whereas monetary policy 
alone can deal with common inflationary shocks, it cannot fight deflationary shocks of a large 
magnitude. In such cases, an appropriate policy mix is required, whence aggregate fiscal policy 
plays a major role. 
 
At first sight, the 2008-2009 crisis should be regarded as a –large-- common negative shock, in 
the terminology of the OCA theory. But is it really so? Or at least, was it perceived as such by 
national governments? Looking at the timing of quarterly macroeconomic evolutions, there are 
signs that the impact of the global crisis was not synchronized amongst EU members, and that 
the time lags may help understand some significant differences in national fiscal policy reactions. 
Table 1 indicates the quarterly changes in real GDP, as published by Eurostat in early 2009. 
Focusing on larger EU members, it shows that, for instance, Germany enjoyed a very buoyant 
growth in the first quarter on 2008, while France, as well as most other European countries, was 
experiencing a marked slowdown in economic growth. In the last quarter of 2008, the opposite 
happened, the slowdown in Germany being much steeper than in France, which may explain why   5 
the French government decided not to add to the already announced fiscal stimulus plan, 
whereas the German government went for additional spending in February 2009.  
 
[Table 1, approximately here] 
 
 
1.3. Macroeconomic spillovers from fiscal policies 
 
Because the European monetary union was conceived at a time when monetary stability was 
widely held to be the single, most desirable objective, and with the aim of minimizing 
centralization, i.e. transferring only monetary powers at the supranational level, while leaving 
most attributes of economic sovereignty, especially fiscal and tax policies, in the hands of 
national governments, interdependencies stemming from the use of these instruments were given 
most attention in the debate over economic policy coordination. But due to the belief that large 
common negative shocks were not likely, the emphasis was put on fiscal rules, rather than on 
instruments to promote positive coordination. 
 
Macroeconomic spillovers from national fiscal policies in a monetary union arise as a 
consequence either of market integration or, due to monetary integration, of the interactions 
between the aggregate outcome of decentralized fiscal policies and the central bank’s decision 
process. Let us focus on the first category, such spillovers may be either positive –the so-called 
traditional Keynesian spillovers, that result from the multiplier effects of fiscal policies and their 
“locomotive effects” through trade– or negative, mostly through the consequences of deficit 
financing on financial variables, be they interest rates or exchange rates.  
 
A major indicator of the strength of traditional, Keynesian interdependencies is the degree of 
trade opennessix
 
. As is apparent from Table 2, the situation of EU members on the eve of the 
current crisis was, in this regard, contrasted, with most larger countries only moderately open, 
while smaller ones were, on average, much more open to trade, albeit with a few exceptions 
(Greece and Portugal, in particular).  
 [Tables 2 and 3, and Chart 1, approximately here] 
 
An additional piece of evidence is provided by the change over time in the trade openness ratio, 
shown in Chart 1 for a selection of EU member states. In most smaller countries, not only was 
this ratio already high in the mid-90s, but it has been steadily rising since then, while the ratio has 
been mostly flat, and much lower, for all but one larger EU members, the exception being 
Germany. 
 
The rationale for the SGP, the rule imposed in the Amsterdam Treaty on national fiscal policiesx, 
is directly inspired by the assumption that such trade spillovers are relatively negligible, compared 
to other sources of, this time negative, spillovers arising in a monetary union whose priority in 
monetary stability. The latter tend to result from the weakening of discipline devices bearing on 
national fiscal policies for countries forming a currency union and from the nuisances that are 




Economic theory suggests that positive spillovers or collective good situations should be dealt 
with by a centralized authority or other devices that foster collective action, either by common 
policy instruments or by incentives for decentralized decision-makers to act in the common   6 
interest, whereas negative spillovers can in principle be fought either by negative incentives or by 
the adoption of rules imposing limits and constraints on national fiscal policies, in order to 
prevent the nuisances arising from “bad behaviour” and “excessive public deficits”. But these 
rules have a cost, in terms of lost opportunities or reduced flexibility, and they should be properly 





2. Heterogeneity in the Euro zone 
 
Part of the difficulty in agreeing on common macroeconomic orientations may  arise from 
differences in initial conditions, and in perceived margins of manoeuvre. Indeed, in spite of 
efforts during the transition phase to economic and monetary union, especially through the 
imposition of convergence criteria –the so-called Maastricht criteria--, the economies of the Euro 
zone have proved much more heterogeneous than had been expected. This is clearly shown in 
the standard macroeconomic performance indicators, especially measures of economic growth, 
long term real interest rates and public finance indicators, as well as in the current account 
positions of the various member states (Tables 4 to 7). How to explain such heterogeneity? That 
it may result from asymmetric shocks seems hard to believe, although there have undoubtedly 
been some divergences in domestic policy orientations. But whatever the sources of such 
divergences, they have, in the Euro zone, yielded different monetary conditions in the member 
states: in the last decade, under monetary union, with identical nominal short-term interest rates 
and, until recently, almost equal long-term ones, differences in domestic inflation rates were 
reflected in different real interest rates; and lower real rates not only tend to boost economic 
growth by making investment and private indebtedness less costly, but also reduce the real 
burden of existing public debt, thus easing the task of fiscal policy making. 
 
[Tables 4 to 7, approximately here] 
 
 
3. Possible causes of macroeconomic heterogeneity: Small and large states coping with 
differences in incentives 
 
Although the equal treatment principle is deeply entrenched in the democratic ideals and widely 
regarded as the only fair organization rule in a democracy, there seems to be a problem with the 
“one-size-fits-all” principle in the field of  fiscal policy rules in the EU. In particular, the 
implementation of the SGP has shown weaknesses that have been clearly correlated with country 
size: thus, in 2004, all four large countries of the EU had budget deficits above the 3%-of-GDP 
ceiling; and will again in 2009. The 2004 episode, as well as the conflict over qualified majority 
rules that forestalled the adoption of the constitutional treaty project, have revealed a profound 
cleavage between small and large countries in the EU, a distinction that had never been apparent 
before. For scholars of the history of federal states and institutions, especially of the United 
States of America, this should not come as a surprise (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004).  
 
Nor indeed for economists, as it has long been emphasized that in contexts of “collective 
action”, size matters and smaller players are more likely to free-ride and exploit larger ones 
(Olson, 1965), and can easily be shown, the incentives –costs and benefits of various courses of 
action-- facing a small open economy are not at all the same as the ones facing a medium-sized 
one, such as Germany or France, which may help explain the differences in performances and 
strategies that seem so systematic in the recent history of the euro zone.  
   7 
For a small open economy, traditional fiscal policy of the Keynesian kind will usually be of 
limited effectiveness, whereas all policies that improve the competitiveness of the national 
economy by lowering production costs of firms located in the domestic economy are relatively 
more powerful: this may explain why fiscal consolidations in small countries have been found to 
have “non-Keynesian” effects (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996); it also suggests that tax 
competition, “structural reforms” and wage moderation policies will all have very powerful, 
positive effects for a small open economy, both because exports represent a major fraction of 
demand to domestic firms and because the elasticity of the supply of external capital –  in 
particular foreign direct investments – is higher, the smaller and the more open the economy is. 
In addition, policies that lower production costs in a small economy do not harm domestic 
demand very much, and they have little incidence on domestic inflation, so that they do not raise 
real interest rates, as nominal rates in a monetary union tend to be uniform across countries and 
to be relatively little influenced by the policies of a single, small countryxiii
 
. 
For large countries, on the contrary, free riding is almost impossible, and the various policy 
choices reviewed above tend to be more costly, or even counterproductive. Traditional, 
Keynesian-style demand-management policies, especially fiscal policies are more efficient than 
for a small open economy, because demand spillovers are relatively lower. On the other hand, all 
policies tending to lower production costs are less effective, and they all tend to lead to a lower 
domestic inflation, which then results in a higher real interest rate, so that they tend to be costly 
in terms of economic activity and growth. The contrasted fates of Germany and Ireland over the 
past few years seem to be a perfect illustration of this difficulty of large countries in an economic 
and monetary union (Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2007). 
 
 
4. Automatic fiscal stabilizers 
 
But aren’t cats herded enough after all? In the weeks preceding the G20 summit in London, the 
controversy between the US government and EU national governments over the required size of 
national fiscal stimulus packages revolved around the magnitude and potential effectiveness of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers: whereas the US discretionary fiscal stimulus was, indeed, much larger 
than the announced EU plans. Europeans pointed to the allegedly much larger automatic fiscal 
stabilizers existing in Europe, with the implication that they needed not do as much as the US 
federal government in terms of discretionary fiscal stimulus.  
 
This dispute over automatic fiscal stabilizers is reminiscent of some of the European 
controversies over the SGP: in the minds of defenders of the SGP, with national budgets at or 
close to balance on average over the economic cycle, 3% of GDP was regarded as a sufficient 
margin of manoeuvre for national fiscal policies faced with the usual economic downturns; and 
this magnitude was deemed to correspond, at least roughly, to the size of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers incorporated in European national public sectors.  
 
In theory, in the context of monetary unions and according the standard OCA theory arguments, 
one should distinguish between automatic stabilizers embedded in the functioning of the central 
budget (Sachs, 1992; Zumer, 1998; Melitz and Zumer, 2000), and those arising from the 
functioning of national public sectors. With regard to the first category, it is well known that the 
EU budget is both too small and little sensitive to cyclical fluctuations to play a significant role, 
whereas the US federal budget has been shown to act as an automatic cushioning mechanism in 
case of asymmetric shocks occurring within the US economy. But it is nonetheless the case that 
the state and local public sectors pursue highly pro-cyclical fiscal policies in the US, for various 
reasons, including the institutional setting in which state and local fiscal policies are decided: in 
this respect, it may be argued that the magnitude of the discretionary federal fiscal stimulus is, at   8 
least in part, aimed at counteracting the pro-cyclicality of state and local fiscal policies 
(Le Cacheux, 1983; Schelkle, 2009). 
 
What about the magnitude of automatic fiscal stabilizers embedded in European national public 
sectors? At first sight, they may look larger, insofar as the size of public sectors and the extent of 
social welfare devices are much larger on average in EU countries than in the US. However, it is 
also the case in Europe that local public sectors tend to behave pro-cyclically, even though this is 
probably less documented than in the US. And there is evidence that, over the past decades, 
general governments’ budgets have evolved toward lesser automatic stabilizers (Solow, 2004; 
Creel and Saraceno, 2008): (personal and corporate) income tax schedules have become less 
progressive, while in many countries the generosity and length of various counter-cyclical, welfare 
devices –and most prominently unemployment benefits—have been significantly reduced. How 
important is this reduction in the magnitude of automatic stabilizers is hard to assess precisely. 
 
 
5. The heterogeneity of national fiscal stimulus packages 
 
Table 8 gives the composition of fiscal stimulus plans in a selection of EU countriesxiv
 
. Whereas 
it provides only mixed evidence on the effect of country size on national fiscal policy choices, it 
clearly supports the view that national discretionary measures are very heterogeneous, both in 
size and in the precise targeting of sectors and types of expenditures. In particular, the UK 
appears to be the only country to have resorted to an across-the-board measure to support 
private domestic consumption, a VAT temporary cut, which, if effective at all, will benefit 
foreign as well as domestic producers; by contrast, all other countries featuring in the table –all 
members of the Euro zone, incidentally—have tended to favour stimulus measures targeted at 
home producers, such as public investment. But, as shown in Table 9, the sizes and composition 
of national fiscal stimulus plans are not such that any defined pattern emerges, except for the fact 
that they definitely are smaller than the one enacted in the US. 
[Tables 8 and 9, approximately here] 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks: fiscal policy coordination without a gouvernement économique 
 
As abundantly illustrated by the vicissitudes of the Stability and Growth Pact and by the poor 
performance of the economies of Euro zone over the past few years, fiscal policy coordination is 
still embryonic and not very satisfactory in the European monetary union, after more than ten 
years of existence of the European currency. Though not really surprising, when considered in a 
historical perspective –it took much more than ten years for the US Federal Reserve System, 
created in 1913, and the Federal government to set up the subtle mechanisms of macroeconomic 
management that are now seen to operate in the US economy - this difficulty is clearly hampering 
the achievement of other goals and negatively affecting the whole process of institution-building 
and integration in the EU. This lack of coordination appears especially costly in the current crisis, 
with the prospects of a very deep and protracted recession, followed by a very shallow recovery 
in the Euro zone. 
 
Because of the still very large divergences in preferences and perceptions of costs and benefits of 
the various possible strategies for fiscal policies, and more generally for economic policy-making 
amongst member governments of the Euro zone, the prospects for a genuine economic 
government of the Euro zone are rather gloomy. It is therefore not surprising that in the face of 
the massive recession that has hit the EU economies, coordinated policy responses have not   9 
easily been forthcoming. This is all the more problematic as an appropriate aggregate fiscal 
orientation, as well as an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix, would probably prove more 
effective in fighting the recession than disorderly national policy responses that seem to be 
inspired, at least in part, by free-riding considerations. And although all EU governments are now 
facing very similar fiscal circumstances – high public deficits and sharply increasing public debt 
ratios - it seems unlikely that cats will be more easily herded when it comes to public finance 
consolidation plans. 
 
In the absence of a genuine gouvernement économique
xv
 
 that would in some way aggregate preferences 
over common rules and collective goods and make use of policy instruments to ensure their 
provision, there may be ways to improve on the current performance within existing institutions. 
In 2005, in response to difficulties in the implementation of the SGP, the latter was reformed and 
notably improved to face small, idiosyncratic shocks. But this is clearly insufficient to elicit 
coordinated fiscal policies in much stormier economic times. A more ambitious reflection would 
try to explore the possibilities of developing federalism, either by embarking on a reinforcement 
of the central EU budget along the lines once suggested by the MacDougall Report (EC 
Commission, 1977) or, more realistically perhaps, to devise an original brand of highly 
decentralized federalism, which may be labelled “Pigouvian federalism” (Le Cacheux, 2004), in 
which the central budget would remain relatively small, but where an appropriate mix of rules – 
with desirable features, such as an amended “golden rule” of public finance, whereby 
expenditures to be encouraged are not counted in the agreed deficit ceiling or target -- and 
financial incentives, in the European budget, is set up in order to induce national governments to 
undertake actions that are collectively considered to be in the common interest.   1
0 
Table 1: GDP growth rates in EU countries, quarterly profiles 
 
 
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter   Percentage 
change 
compared with 
the same quarter 
of the previous 
year  
2008   2008  
Q1   Q2   Q3   Q4   Q1   Q2   Q3   Q4  
EA15   0.7   -0.2   -0.2   -1.5   2.1   1.4   0.6   -1.2  
EU27   0.6   0.0   -0.2   -1.5   2.3   1.7   0.8   -1.1  
EA16   0.7   -0.2   -0.2   -1.5   2.1   1.5   0.7   -1.2  
Member States  
Belgium   0.4   0.3   0.1   -1.3   1.9   1.9   1.2   -0.5  
Bulgaria**   :   :   :   :   7.0   7.1   6.8   :  
Czech Republic   1.0   1.0   0.9   -0.6   4.9   4.6   4.2   1.0  
Denmark   -1.2   0.4   -0.4   :   -0.7   0.6   -1.3   :  
Germany   1.5   -0.5   -0.5   -2.1   2.8   2.0   0.8   -1.6  
Estonia**   -1.2   -1.5   -0.9   :   0.2   -1.1   -3.5   :  
Ireland   -0.3   -0.6   1.2   :   -1.2   -0.7   0.1   :  
Greece   0.8   1.1   0.5   0.3   3.1   3.5   2.9   2.6  
Spain   0.4   0.1   -0.3   -1.0   2.7   1.8   0.9   -0.7  
France   0.4   -0.3   0.1   -1.2   2.1   1.2   0.6   -1.0  
Italy   0.4   -0.6   -0.6   -1.8   0.3   -0.4   -1.1   -2.6  
Cyprus   1.0   0.8   0.6   0.6   4.1   4.0   3.5   3.0  
Latvia**   -7.4   1.3   1.1   :   0.5   -1.9   -5.2   -10.5  
Lithuania   -0.3   1.0   0.3   -2.4   7.0   5.3   2.8   -1.4  
Luxembourg   -0.8   1.5   -1.4   :   0.9   2.4   0.0   :  
Hungary   0.5   0.0   -0.5   -1.0   1.4   1.5   0.5   -1.0  
Malta   0.2   1.0   0.1   :   3.1   3.6   2.5   :  
Netherlands**   0.5   -0.1   -0.3   -0.9   3.6   3.3   1.9   -0.6  
Austria   0.5   0.2   0.0   -0.2   2.5   2.1   1.4   0.5  
Poland   1.2   1.3   1.2   :   6.1   5.8   5.6   :  
Portugal   -0.3   0.3   -0.1   -2.0   0.9   0.6   0.5   -2.1  
Romania**   :   :   :   :   8.2   9.3   9.1   :  
Slovenia   1.9   0.5   0.7   :   5.9   4.7   3.5   :  
Slovakia**   -3.3   1.9   1.9   2.1   9.3   7.9   6.6   2.7  
Finland   0.2   0.5   0.1   :   2.6   2.2   1.4   :  
Sweden   0.0   -0.1   -0.1   :   1.7   0.7   0.3   :  
United Kingdom   0.4   0.0   -0.6   -1.5   2.6   1.7   0.3   -1.8  
EFTA countries  
Iceland   -1.6   4.7   -3.4   :   3.2   4.7   -0.8   :  
Norway   0.2   0.1   -0.7   :   3.6   3.0   0.6   :  
Switzerland   0.3   0.3   0.0   :   3.1   2.5   1.7   :  
Main economic partners  
United States   0.2   0.7   -0.1   -1.0   2.5   2.1   0.7   -0.2  
Japan   0.6   -1.0   -0.5   :   1.4   0.6   -0.3   :  
 
Source: EU Commission, February 2009 forecasts. 
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Table   2  : Trade to GDP in 2005 for OECD countries    
  
United     States     13,4    
Japan     13,6    
Australia     21    
Greece     22    
Italy     26,3    
France     26,6    
Spain     28,2    
United     Kingdom     28,3    
New     Zealand     29,1    
Mexico     30,7    
Turkey     30,7    
Portugal     32,9    
Canada     36    
Norway     36,7    
Poland     37,2    
Germany     38,1    
Iceland     38,3    
Finland     39    
Korea     41,2    
Switzerland     44,5    
Sweden     44,9    
OECD     average     45    
Denmark     46,2    
EU15     average     50,7    
Austria     51,9    
Netherlands     66,1    
Hungary     67,1    
Czech     Republic     70,8    
Ireland     74,9    
Slova  k     Republic     79,8    
Belgium     86    
Slovenia     129,7    
Luxembourg     148,6    
  
Source  : OECD.      1
2 





















Source: OECD, and Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2007.  1
3 
Table 3: First 15 trade partners of Germany in 2005 
Exports  912,2  %    Imports  796,2  % 
France  79  8,7    France  53,7  6,7 
US  69,3  7,6    Netherlands  51,8  6,5 
UK  60,4  6,6    US  41,8  5,2 
Italy  53,9  5,9    China  40,8  5,1 
Netherlands  49  5,4    UK  39,1  4,9 
Belgium  43,6  4,8    Italy  36,3  4,6 
Austria  43,3  4,7    Belgium  28,8  3,6 
Spain  40  4,4    Austria  26  3,3 
Swiss  29,6  3,2    Swiss  22,6  2,8 
Poland  22,3  2,4    Russia  22,3  2,8 
China  21,2  2,3    Japan  21,8  2,7 
Russia  17,3  1,9    Spain  18,1  2,3 
Tch. Rep.  19,2  2,1    Tch.Rep.  17,7  2,2 
Sweden  17,2  1,9    Poland  16,8  2,1 
Hungary  13,6  1,5    Norway  15,1  1,9 
 
Source: Destatis, and Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2007. 
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Table 4: GDP growth rates in Euro Zone countries, ten-year averages 
  Average  Average  Average 
  1979-1988  1989-1998  1999-2008 
AUT  2,21  2,66  2,27 
BEL  2,04  2,09  2,27 
DEU  1,97  2,52  1,56 
ESP  2,22  2,69  3,54 
FIN  3,70  1,74  3,36 
FRA  2,24  1,96  2,16 
GRC  0,73  1,95  4,15 
IRL  2,84  6,58  5,85 
ITA  2,78  1,58  1,36 
LUX  3,81  4,93  4,88 
NLD  1,72  3,17  2,35 
PRT  3,27  3,17  1,70 
EURO  2,23  2,25  2,12 
Ecart-type  0,87  1,47  1,41 
   
 
Table 5: Current accounts in Euro Zone countries, (% of GDP, ten-year averages) 
  Average  Average  Average 
  1979-1988  1989-1998  1999-2008 
AUT  -0,43  -1,20  0,57 
BEL  0,52  4,68  3,26 
DEU  1,43  0,12  3,23 
ESP  -0,57  -1,73  -5,90 
FIN  -1,42  -0,07  5,93 
FRA  -1,10  0,48  0,42 
GRC  -4,58  -3,28  -8,75 
IRL  -6,19  1,42  -2,00 
ITA  -0,74  0,49  -1,26 
LUX       
NLD  2,17  4,11  5,17 
PRT  -3,41  -2,01  -9,13 
EURO  0,05  0,26  0,31 
Ecart-type  2,52  2,44  5,27 
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Table 6: Real long-term interest rates in Euro Zone countries, ten-year averages 
  Average  Average  Average 
  1979-1988  1989-1998  1999-2008 
AUT  4,32  4,40  2,60 
BEL  5,81  5,20  2,27 
DEU  4,80  4,15  2,81 
ESP    5,03  1,16 
FIN  2,91  6,62  2,65 
FRA  4,32  5,27  2,61 
GRC  -1,75  5,58  0,66 
IRL  3,53  5,47  0,70 
ITA  2,79  6,18  2,22 
LUX  5,83  4,20  0,97 
NLD  5,22  4,61  2,15 
PRT  4,04  6,76  1,55 
EURO      2,21 
Ecart-type  2,11  0,89  0,81 
   
 
 
Table 7: Public deficits in Euro Zone countries, (% of GDP, ten-year averages) 
  Average  Average  Average 
  1979-1988  1989-1998  1999-2008 
AUT  -3,26  -3,41  -1,51 
BEL  -10,61  -5,26  -0,27 
DEU  -2,39  -2,40  -1,99 
ESP  -4,72  -4,78  0,15 
FIN  3,49  -1,84  3,87 
FRA  -2,15  -3,90  -2,68 
GRC  -7,09  -9,26  -4,25 
IRL  -10,27  -1,43  1,35 
ITA  -10,46  -8,39  -2,80 
LUX    2,15  2,27 
NLD  -4,62  -3,18  -0,32 
PRT  -6,62  -5,12  -3,41 
EURO  -4,54  -4,22  -1,74 
Ecart-type  4,30  3,06  2,44 
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Table 8: National fiscal stimulus plans in a selection of EU countries, as of January 2009 
 
Source: Natixis, compiled from national sources.
  Bn €  UK  Germany  France   Italy  Spain 
Housing  2.1  1.8  1.8  0.3  0.5 
Public infrastructures  1.2  4.6  10.5  1.4  8.0 
Private investment incentives  0.5  19.5  10.7  1.2  7.3 
Incentives to buy durable goods    3.5  1.0  2.6  1.8 
Private consumption support  15.0  0.5  1.5    0.6 
Public consumption  1.2  2.0      0.9 
Total (bn €)  20.0  31.9  25.5  5.5  19.1 
Total (% of GDP)  1.2  1.3  1.3  0.4  1.7 
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Table 9: Automatic and discretionary variations in fiscal balances in the 11 original Euro 
zone members* 
(% of GDP) 






  2007  2008  2009  2010  2009  2010  2009  2010 
Austria  -0.4  -0.6  -3.1  -5.1  -1.3  -0.9  -4.7  -6.0 
Belgium  -0.2  -1.2  -3.7  -4.7  -1.0  -0.6  -4.8  -5.3 
Finland  5.2  4.1  0.5  -1.5  -1.5  -0.5  -1.1  -2.2 
France  -2.7  -3.4  -5.5  -7.7  -1.6  -0.6  -7.2  -8.3 
Germany  -0.2  -0.1  -3.4  -4.7  -1.5  -2.0  -5.0  -6.7 
Greece  -3.6  -5.0  -6.9  -8.5  0.0  0.0  -7.1  -8.6 
Ireland  0.2  -7.1  -12.8  -12.3  3.2  1.9  -10.0  -10.5 
Italy  -1.5  -2.5  -5.5  -6.0  -0.2  -0.1  -5.8  -6.1 
Netherlands  0.3  1.0  -1.6  -2.3  -1.0  -0.5  -2.5  -2.8 
Portugal  -2.6  -2.6  -5.4  -7.1  -1.3  -0.4  -6.6  -7.5 
Spain  2.2  -3.8  -6.8  -10.5  -2.0  -1.0  -9.0  -11.5 
Euro zone  -0.6  -1.9  -4.8  -6.4  -1.0  -0.7  -5.8  -7.1 
 
* Excluding Luxembourg and including Greece, who joined in January 2002. 
** Including interest payments 
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iii   Rather than a clear-cut distinction between these two generic situations of interdependencies, they may 
be thought of as pertaining in a continuum, as convincingly advocated by Buchanan (1968), who also points to 
the similarities between public goods and “club goods”, here aggregated under the label “collective goods”, and 
to the subjective nature of such economic interdependencies, insofar as they may not be purely “technological”, 
but may also be generated by perceived interdependencies of individuals’ (actors’) utility functions. 
 
iv   This is of course reminiscent of the well-established tradition of functionalist analysis of regional 
integration processes, which does not have to be teleological, as the rest of this chapter endeavours to show. 
 
v   As emphasized in the economic literature of “optimal currency areas” (OCA), initiated by Mundell 
(1961), the nature of macroeconomic shocks, and most importantly the distinction between common, or 
symmetric, and idiosyncratic, or asymmetric shocks, is a major dimension of the analysis of stabilization policies 
in a monetary union. See below. 
 
vi   But not necessarily monetary conditions and all nominal variables: in particular, inflation rates will 
usually differ amongst countries in a monetary union, as will be made clearer in the following. 
 
vii   On OCA implications for the Euro Zone, one may refer to Obstfeld and Peri (1998). On the 
Commission view, see Buti and Sapir (1998). On the rationale for the Stability Pact, see, in particular, Buiter, et 
al. (1993), Le Cacheux (2007).  
 
viii   On the functioning of the BEPG, see the recent paper by Deroose, Hodson and Kuhlmann (2008) and 
the numerous references therein. Their overall judgement is moderately positive, but they don’t raise the issue of 
coordination in the face of large common shocks. 
 
ix   Of course, rather than measuring a country’s total trade with the rest of the world, it would be preferable 
to focus on intra-European trade. But because the average share of intra-European trade is approximately 2/3, the 
rough indication given with total trade is sufficient. An indication is given for the case of Germany in Table 3. 
 
x   The Stability and Growth Pact was conceived as a sequel of the so-called “Maastricht criteria”, asset of 
conditions that had meant to secure convergence of public finances amongst the EU countries before the creation 
of the monetary union. The Pact, instead, is a permanent fiscal rule adopted in June 1997 in a Protocol of the 
Amsterdam treaty. 
 
xi   On the rationale for “rules rather than coordination”, a more detailed analysis in offered in Le Cacheux 
(2007). 
 
xii   There has been a very abundant literature on the merits and inconveniences of a ceiling on public 
deficits, such as included in the Stability and Growth Pact, following the critical piece on the “Maastricht 
criteria” by Buiter et al. (1993). See, for instance, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998). For recent assessments, see 
the collection of papers in Farina and Tamborini, eds., 2008. 
 
xiii   The notion of “small, open economy” also refers to the idea that it has no influence on its environment, 
therefore is a “price taker” and, in game theory terms, chooses strategies without caring about possible reactions 
or retaliation from partners. Our arguments are also somewhat reminiscent of, though different from the well-
known result of trade theory, namely that small countries gain from a unilateral tariff reduction, whereas larger 
countries are likely to lose. Another way of putting the argument would be to say that a small country faces a   2
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much more elastic supply of foreign capital and/or firms that a large one, or else that the former faces a much 
more favourable Laffer curve than the latter. 
 
xiv   Additional evidence may be found in Saha and von Weizsäker (2009). They refer to those measures of 
national fiscal stimulus packages taking effect in 2009, and their figures are not fully consistent with those in the 
table. 
 
xv   On this notion, see various other contributions in Linsenmann, Meyer and Wessels, eds., 2007, as well 
as Commissariat général du Plan, 1999. 
 